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GRANDPARENT VISITATION AND INTACT
MARRIAGES: AN UNRESOLVED MARYLAND FAMILY
LAW ISSUE
Christopher W. Nicholsont
Murray o. Singerman:f:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Visitation disputes traditionally involve husbands and wives battling to limit each other's visitation with their children. Recently, a
surprising variation on the customary visitation dispute has emergedparents in intact marriages who have denied estranged grandparents
visitation with their grandchildren are forced to defend their decision
in court. Eleven states have enacted legislation that appears to permit
grandparents to petition for visitation rights without requiring standing based on a prior breakup of the nuclear family. I
This Article posits that current Maryland law permits a trial
court to award a grandparent visitation with a grandchild over
parental objection in an intact marriage when compelling circumstances exist. Depending on the view adopted by the appellate courts
concerning the importance of the grandparent-grandchild relationship, however, it is possible that grandparents may be awarded
visitation rights even absent compelling circumstances.
While it is easy to conceive of how the breakup of a marriage,
with a concomitant custody battle, might generate a visitation conflict
involving grandparents, 2 visitation disputes pitting grandparents against
t B.S., 1979, University of Delaware; J.D., 1982, University of Baltimore; Head,
Family Law Department, Blum, Yumkas, Mailman, Gutman & Denick, P.A.,
Baltimore, Maryland; Adjunct Professor, University of Baltimore School of
Law.
t B.A., 1980, Yeshiva University; M.A., 1983, New York University; Rabbinic
Ordination, 1986, Yeshiva University; J.D., 1992, University of Baltimore;
Associate, Blum, Yumkas, Mailman, Gutman & Denick, Baltimore, Maryland.
l. See infra Section VI. Cj. Smith v. Jones, 587 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
New York has enacted legislation that appears to provide that grandparents in
the intact marriage may be granted visitation if this is found to be in the best
interests of the child. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. The Jones
court strongly noted in dicta, however, the belief that courts have no constitutional authority to intercede in visitation issues when the parent's custody or
right to custody has not been abrogated. Jones, 587 N. Y.S.2d at 511.
2. A number of states have enacted legislation to allow for grandparent visitation
subsequent to the termination of the parent's marriage. See Annotation,
Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 90 A.L.R.3d 222, 237-45 (1979).
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parents in an intact marriage would seem an infrequent occurrence.
As the ever-growing body of case law shows, however, such situations
are not uncommon. They arise often where financial or other disputes
lead parents to cut off their children's visitation with their grandparents.
To resolve these disputes, standing and other constitutional issues
must be addressed. Even if the grandparent has standing, the courts
must then determine if an award of visitation rights to grandparents
violates the parents' constitutional rights. 3
II.

MARYLAND'S GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE

A.

Standing: Two Possible Interpretations
Maryland's grandparent visitation statute,4 entitled "Petition by
grandparents for visitation," provides as follows:
At any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce,
annulment, or death, an equity court may:
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation by a
grandparent of a natural or adopted child of the parties
whose marriage has been terminated; and
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the
child, grant visitation rights to the grandparent. s
As with similar statutes from other states, Maryland's grandparent
visitation statute requires a two step inquiry. 6 A grandparent seeking
visitation rights must first show that she or he has standing to
petition the court,? and must then convince the court that visitation
would be in the best interest of the child. 8
Maryland's statute is susceptible to two interpretations regarding
standing. The statute may be construed as limiting visitation to a
situation in whIch the relationship between the mother and father
has dissolved, in which case grandparents petitioning the court in an
intact marriage would lack standing. Alternatively, the statute may

3. This article does not address the issue of the child's right to petition the court
for visitation.
4. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1991).
5. [d.
6. Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents'
Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 122 (1986).
7. As used in this article, "standing" means that the grandparent has a sufficient
stake in what is an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution.
8. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102(2) (1991). This section was amended by
the General Assembly during the 1993 legislative session. See infra note 161.
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be interpreted as expressly granting power to the courts to grant
grandparents' visitation in the case of the dissolved marriage, but
not as limiting the courts' power to grant visitation in other circumstances. 9 Under this view, grandparents would not be denied standing
to petition for visitation, even if the marriage was still intact.
The latter construction, allowing for grandparent visitation, is
consistent with the decision of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland in Skeens v. Paterno,1O wherein the court interpreted the
predecessor to the present grandparent visitation statute. II The statute
provided in part that "[a]t any time following the termination of a
marriage the court may consider a petition for reasonable visitation
by one or more of the grandparents."12 In Skeens, Debra Skeens,
an unmarried minor, gave birth to a child, which she and her parents
attempted to place for adoption. The child's father, Jeffrey Paterno,
intervened, seeking visitation. The trial court not only granted Paterno liberal visitation, but additionally held that Paterno's visitation
rights could be exercised by his parents while he was away on naval
duty.13
The Skeenses appealed, maintaining that the grandparent visitation statute applied only to situations where a marriage had been
9. See Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 58-59, 480 A.2d 820, 825-26, cert.
denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984). Construing then MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-602(a)(4), the court of special appeals stated:
According to the Skeenses, that language limits court-authorized
grandpa rental visitation to a situation in which a marriage has terminated. In the case before us, there never was a marriage. Therefore,
they insist, the court could not permit grandparental visitation. The
statute is susceptible to that interpretation. It might also, however, be
read as intending only to make it clear that a court may allow
grandparental visitation after termination of a marriage, rather than
as a limitation on such visitation in other circumstances.
Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 58-59, 480 A.2d at 825.
10. 60 Md. App. 48, 480 A.2d 820, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274
(1984).
11. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-602(a)(4) (1984) provided:
(a) Jurisdiction oj courts oj equity.-A court of equity has jurisdiction
over the custody, guardianship, legitimation, maintenance, visitation
and support of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:
(4) Determine who shall have visitation rights to a child. At any
time following the termination of a marriage, the court may consider
a petition for reasonable visitation by one or more of the grandparents
of a natural or adopted child of the parties whose marriage has been
terminated, and may grant such visitation if the court believes it to
be in best interests of the child.

[d.
12. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 58, 480 A.2d at 825 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 3-602(a)(4) (1984».
13. [d. at 53, 480 A.2d at 822.
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terminated. Because Debra had never married, they argued that the
trial court had clearly erred in allowing the child's paternal grandparents to exercise the father's visitation rights,'4 The court of special
appeals rejected this narrow reading of the statute and held that a
trial court is not so limited in granting grandparental visitation. IS In
declaring that the statute was not intended to limit grandparental
visitation in this situation, the cou~ stated the following:
We hold ... that § 3-602(a)(4) does no more than restate
existing law as to grandparental visitation rights in a termination of marriage context. It does not limit the power

of a court as to custody and visitation by grandparents
under other circumstances. 16
This statement by the court raises the question whether the court
intended the "other circumstances" language to apply only to circumstances in which a parental relationship has dissolved, or whether
it was meant to apply to all situations, including an intact marriage.
If the statement was intended to apply only to a dissolved relationship, then grandparents in an intact marriage setting would lack
standing to petition for visitation rights. If the "other circumstances"
language was meant to be open-ended, dissolution of the parental
relationship would not be a prerequisite for standing, and grandparents in an intact marriage setting would have standing to petition
for visitation rights.
The judicial treatment of New Jersey's grandparent visitation
statute illustrates the validity of this query. Similar to Maryland's
grandparent visitation statute with regard to the recital of the circumstances of death or divorce, New Jersey's statute provides for
grandparent or sibling visitation
[w]here either or both of the parents of a minor child is
deceased, or divorced or living separate and apparent in
different habitats, if the court determines that the best
interests of the child may require, for visitation rights for
such grandparent, grandparents, or sibling in respect to such
a childY
In Thompson v. Vanaman,ls the New Jersey Superior Court held
that New Jersey's grandparent visitation statute was not limited to
14. [d. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826.

15. [d.
16. [d. (emphasis added); see Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 342, 488 A.2d 157,
161 (1985) (approving the Skeens construction of § 3-602(a)(4».

17. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1992).
18. Thompson v. Vanaman, 509 A.2d 304 (N.J. Super. ct. Ch. Div.), rev'd, 515
A.2d 1254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
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situations where the parental relationship had dissolved, and recognized that grandparents have standing in an intact marriage. 19 The
appellate division, however, proffering that it was not in the child's
best interest to force him into the midst of a conflict between the
parents and grandparents,20 reversed the trial court, holding that the
statute was limited to 'situations where the parental relationship was
disrupted. 21
The treatment of New Jersey's grandparent visitation statute
illustrates that although the protections of a statute might appear to
be actuated only by termination of a marriage, judicial interpretation
might nonetheless not require termination of marriage, thus allowing
for the possibility of grandparent visitation in an intact marriage.
Analysis of the legislative history and judicial interpretation of Maryland's statute supports the conclusion that in Maryland grandparents
presently have standing to petition the court for visitation where the
parents' relationship is intact.

B.

Standing: Not Limited To A Dissolved Relationship
Historically, grandparental visitation has been grounded in parental permission. 22 Despite judicial recognition that visitation with
grandparents may be in the best interests of the child,23 grandparents
have enjoyed neither common law, constitutional, nor explicit statutory rights to visitation with their grandchildren. 24 For example,
Chapter 317 of the Acts of 1975, which enacted section 3-602(a)(4)
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and provided that a
court of equity's jurisdiction included the power to "determine who
shall have visitation rights to a child,"2s omitted a specific provision
for grandparental visitation.
Not until the adoption of Senate Bill 333 in 1981 were grandparents in Maryland guaranteed the statutory right to visit their
grandchildren. Adopted after a four-year effort to enact legislation,
Senate Bill 333, which amended section 3-602(a)(4), was entitled
19. Thompson, 509 A.2d at 306.
20. [d.
21. Thompson v. Vanaman, 515 A.2d 1254, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986).
22. L.F.M. v. Department of Social Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 386, 507 A.2d 1151,
1154 (1986).
23. Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 61, 480 A.2d 820, 826, cert. denied, 301
Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984); Powers v. Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 353
A.2d 641 (1976).
24. See, e.g., L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 386, 507 A.2d at 1154; Emanuel S. v.
Joseph E., 560 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); see also Olds v.
Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984); Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199 (N.J.
1975). See generally Henry H. Foster, Jr., & Doris Jonas Freed, Grandparent
Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643 (1979).
25. 1975 Md. Laws 317.
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"Visitation Rights-Grandparents" and was designed to clarify "that
a court may grant visitation rights to grandparents of a child. "26
As originally proposed, the bill was intended to amend section
3-602(a)(4) to read that the court may "[d]etermine who shall have
visitation rights to a child, including any of the grandparents of the
child if they so request and if the denial of their visitation rights is
an issue in dispute. "27 Fearing that the amendment as proposed was
susceptible to being read as precluding consideration of grandparental
visitation if visitation had not been in dispute originally, the' House
of Delegates amended the bill to read as follows: 28
(a) ... In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:
(4) Determine who shall have visitation rights to a child.
At any time following the termination of a marriage, the
court may consider a petition for reasonable visitation by
one or more of the grandparents of a natural or adopted
child of the parties whose marriage has been terminated,
and may grant such visitation if the court believes it to
be in the best interests of the child .... 29
Since the new language was adopted to avoid the suggestion that
grandparent visitation had to be previously in dispute in order to be
awarded,30 there is no indication that the phrase "following the
termination of a marriage" was intended to address the issue of
standing. Adopting this reasoning, the court of appeals in Skeens
and in Evans rejected a narrow reading of the statute that would
restrict it to circumstances involving marriage. 31
As the Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed in Evans, the
legislative history of the amendment to the visitation statute indicates
that the bill was designed to encourage courts to consider visitation
rights for grandparents after the termination of a marriage. 32 The
court of appeals quoted the testimony of the sponsor of House Bill
1205, a grandparent visitation proposal rejected in 1979, which
explained the continuing efforts to enact a grandparents' visitation
rights bill:

26. Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 59, 480 A.2d at 825 (citing 1981 Md. Laws 276).
27.Id.
28. Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 342, 488 A.2d 157, 161 (1985).
.
29. 1981 Md. Laws 276 (emphasis added).
30. Evans, 302 Md. at 342, 488 A.2d at 161.
31. Evans, 302 Md. at 342-43, 488 A.2d at 161 (granting visitation rights to a
nonadoptive stepmother); Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 60, 480 A.2d at 826.
32. Evans, 302 Md. at 339-43, 488 A.2d at 159-6l.
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In HB 1205 grandparents are not automatically deemed a
group to be considered in the awarding of visitation rights.
They are, however, a category that may be considered for
visitation rights. And once they are considered, they may
only be awarded the rights if it is in the best interest of the
child ....
However, the addition of the new language acts as a
policy statement. It says that the legislature believes the
courts should be considering rights for the grandparents if
it is in the best interest of the child. 33
Moreover, during the four years prior to 1981, opposition to the
measure seemed to be succeeding because of a consensus in the
legislature that existing law already afforded such visitation rights to
grandparents. 34 Based on the statute's legislative history, the courts
in Skeens and Evans thus construed the statute expansively, holding
that the Maryland grandparent visitation statute does not preclude
the award of visitation to grandparents of a child born out of wedlock
or of a nonadoptive stepchild.
Based on the legislative history and the judicial construction of
the grandparent visitation statute in Skeens and Evans, Maryland
courts should grant standing to grandparents to petition for visitation
rights in an intact marriage. As the court stated in Skeens,
[t]he legislative history contains no indication that the bill
was intended as a limitation on grandparental visitationor anyone else's visitation-in other contexts, such as a
case involving an illegitimate child .... [The visitation statute] does not limit the power of a court as to custody and
visitation by grandparents under other circumstances. 35
33. Id. at 340-41, 488 A.2d at 160 (quoting the sponsor of House Bill 1205 (1979».
34. Id. at 340, 488 A.2d at 160. The court in Evans cited two letters demonstrating
this consensus:
In a letter to counsel for the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
about Senate Bill 53 (1978), the Managing Attorney and the Chief
Attorney of the Domestic Law Unit of the Legal Aid Bureau posited
that "[t]he Court under the present law, has the authority, and in
fact does, grant visitation to any person that can further the best
interests of the child." In a letter to a proponent of Senate Bill 415
(1979), the Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee
explained the unfavorable report of the bill as follows: "The Equity
Court at the present time has the authority to designate grandparents'
visitation rights if in the judgment of the Court this is in the best
interest of the child. It was for that reason that the Committee felt
best not to mandate that which is now permitted."
Id.
35. Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 60-61, 480 A.2d 820, 826, cert. denied,
301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984).
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Assuming, then, that grandparents have the right to petition for
visitation rights, an analysis of the parents' and grandparents' constitutional rights must be undertaken, since a state statute that
regulates the fundamental rights of citizens must be subjected to
judicial review. 36
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The relationship between grandparent, parent, child, and the
state implicates the constitutionally protected interests of due process
and equal protection. The due process right to privacy has received
significant judicial attention, while analysis of the implications of
disparate treatment of grandparents in intact marriages, as opposed
to grandparents in dissolved marriages, under the Equal Protection
Clause has received only scant recognition. 37

A.

Due Process Liberty Rights

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
assures due process of law and restricts governmental interference
with the liberty of an individual. 38 The applicable clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. "39
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the word "liberty"
in this clause to provide for protection of substantive rights,40 including the right of privacy to rear one's children free from unjustified state interference and the right of a person to define him or
herself as part of the family. 41
1. ·Right Of Privacy In Childrearing
The fundamental right of privacy, manifest in the right to raise
one's children free from unjustified state interference, is supported
by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska42
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155 (1973).
37. See, e.g., Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 560 N.Y.S.2d 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
see also Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691 (Conn. 1990); Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d
1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987); Frances E. v. Peter E., 479 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1984).
38. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. See Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1156, 1166-68 (1980).
41. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). For purposes of this
article, "family" refers to the nuclear family, including a married mother and
father and child or children, as well as, the grandparents.
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,43 and has been expanded and
reaffirmed in a long line of cases. 44
In Meyer, a state statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages to children before the ninth grade was declared invalid on
grounds that the statute violated parental rights to childrearing. The
Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
protects "the right of the individual to . . . establish a home and
bring up children. "4S In Pierce, a state statute requiring all children
to attend public schools was invalidated as an impermissible interference with the parental right to direct the upbringing and education
of children. 46 During the past seventy years, the Supreme Court's
position on this issue has been well articulated in the language of a
number of cases:
.
It is clear that among the decisions that an individual may

make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to ... childrearing and education ... Y
[The] primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition. 48
43. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
44. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-30 (1988) (finding
putative natural father's substantive due process "liberty" rights were not
violated in suit to establish paternity and rights of visitation); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753-57,769 (1982) (before state severs rights of parents
of neglected children, due process requires state to support allegations by "clear
and convincing evidence;" fundamental liberty interest of child rearing does not
evaporate because parents have temporarily lost control to state); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (state statute requiring pregnant minor seeking
abortion to obtain parental consent or judicial approval unconstitutionally
burdened right of pregnant minor to seek abortion); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (state statute prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives unconstitutional in its restriction of the fundamental right to
choose to bear children without compelling state interest); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave
rules held unconstitutional in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (state statute compelling
Amish parents to cause their children to attend formal high school unconstitutional under First and Fourteenth Amendments); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645,657-58 (1972) (under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment unwed
father entitled to hearing on fitness as parent before his children could be
taken from him in dependency proceeding after death of children's natural
mother).
45. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
46. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
47. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85.
48. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
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The custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents .... [I]t is in recognition of this that [Supreme
Court] decisions have respected the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter .... 49
The tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with
our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one
of the basic presuppositions of the latter. 50
In acknowledging the constitutionally protected "liberty interest"
of childrearing, the Supreme Court has not delineated to whom the
right applies or whether it extends to a situation beyond day-to-day .
care of a child, such as to a grandparent who has some childrearing
responsibilities during periodic visitation. In Ward v. Ward,S I however, the Family Court of the State of Delaware held that grandparents 'do not possess a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest right
to enjoy a relationship with their grandchild "sustained only through
periodic visitation. "52 The court's analysis centered on two areas: (1)
the requirements for recognition of a liberty interest, and (2) the role
of the biological link between grandparent and grandchild viewed
against the role of caregiving in a liberty interest context.
The term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment has no exact
definition, but generally includes privileges recognized at common
law. As stated in Meyer v. Nebraska, a liberty interest may include

•

the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 53
Since at common law a grandparent's right to visit derived from
parental permission, grandparents had no recognized common law
visitation right. 54 Thus, a grandparent could claim a moral right for
visitation, but could not assert a legal obligation to be granted the
same. ss Hence, grandparent visitation was not a liberty interest at
common law. Furthermore, the grandparent's biological link to his
or her grandchild does not overcome the lack of a common law right

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,638 (1979).
537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987).
[d. at 1069.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).
Ward, 537 A.2d at 1067.
[d. (citing 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 41(c) (1968».
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to justify creation of a liberty interest. A biological tie. by itself.
is not enough to warrant Fourteenth Amendment protection; rather.
"the importance of the familial relationship to the individuals involved and to the society. stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association." 57
Liberty interests in the childrearing setting arise only with the
establishment of a custodial relationship. similar to the parent-child
relationship. where one undertakes day-to-day responsibility for nurturing and upbringing of the child. 58 Grandparents generally do not
render daily care to grandchildren residing with their parents; thus
no custodial relationship is created. Without a custodial relationship.
the grandparent's interest is not deemed a "liberty interest"; therefore. any claim to visit grandchildren lacks constitutional protection. 59
Thus while parents enjoy Fourteenth Amendment protection in rearing their children. grandparents lack a "liberty interest" establishing
a right to visitation based on care of the child.
56

2.

Right of Privacy And Family Definition

Despite the grandparents' lack of a liberty interest to compel
visitation. the argument has been made that a grandparent enjoys
the right to include himself or herself in the grandchild's family.60 If
the grandparent has a right to be included in the family. it follows
that the grandparent has the right to exercise that inclusionary right
to compel visitation with his or her grandchild. A court's denial of
a grandparents' petition for visitation rights would effectively exclude

56. See L.F.M. v. Department of Social Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 386-88, 507
A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (1986), in which natural grandparents petitioned for visitation after the termination of parental rights and placement of their grandchildren into a prospective adoptive home. In response to the grandparents'
argument that they had a constitutionally protected right under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court stated:
In each of the cases we have examined . . . which extended the
"family life" liberty interest beyond the marital or parent-child relationship, the petitioning party had, at some point, either actual or
legal custody of the child or children involved. [The grandparents] in
this case have never had, or sought, custody of their grandchildren.
They seek only to continue visitation with them and we have found
no authority to suggest that the visitation [they] enjoyed prior to May
I, 1984, was a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
[d. at 387, 507 A.2d at 1155; see also Ward, 537 A.2d at 1069.
57. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (emphasis added) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
231-33 (1972».
58. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1067-69.
59. [d. at 1069.
60. Shandling, supra note 6, at 128-29.
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the grandparent from the family, thus violating the grandparents'
right to define the parameters of his or her family.
This "family definition" right was expounded in Moore v. City
oj East Cleveland,61 in which the Supreme Court struck down a city
zoning ordinance that prevented an extended family from living
together. The ordinance, which had the effect of barring a grandmother from living with her son and two grandsons who were cousins
and not brothers, was invalidated based on the Court's recognition
that maintenance of the family structure is deserving of Fourteenth
Amendment protection. The Court stated as follows:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the
bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children
has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition. 62
Moore has been used to advance the theory that both grandparents and parents have the right to define their family without
state intervention. 63 "This family definition interest is the constitutional right that grandparents attempt to assert in grandparents'
visitation conflicts ... , the right to draw the boundaries of the
family in such a manner that they could be included."64
In short, the Fourteenth Amendment grants parents the right to
raise their children without unnecessary state interference. In addition, both grandparents and parents have the same right to define
their family, which, in an antagonistic situation, creates conflicting
family definitions. The parent defines the family to exclude the
grandparent while the grandparent defines the family to include
himself or herself.
3.

Right of Privacy And The Strict Scrutiny Standard
Fundamental rights are not immune from state regulation, however, and are subject to state restriction when a compelling interest
exists. As set forth in Roe v. Wade,6s state action restricting fundamental rights may be justified under a strict scrutiny standard when
it both serves a compelling interest and is narrowly drawn to restrict
only those evils that are at stake. 66 States may regulate family life
61. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
62. Id. at 504 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).

63. Shandling, supra note 6, at 128-29. Although this theory was posited in 1986,
judicial opinions dealing with grandparent visitation after 1986 have not referred
to such a right. It is the authors' opinion that this theory deserves consideration,
despite the lack of clarity as to who would be included in and be allowed to
exercise the family definitional right.
64. Id. at 129.
65. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. Id. at 155.
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based on the common law doctrine of parens patriae, "the principle
that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves,
such as minors who lack proper care" from their parents. 67 This
power to protect children may be exercised by the state in derogation
of the parents' fundamental right only when the state has a compelling interest, such as in cases of abuse or neglect. 68 In considering
awarding a grandparent visitation rights, a court must apply the
strict scrutiny standard to see whether the parents' right to raise their
children can be overcome. A court must find a compelling need in
order to order visitation. 69
When the strict scrutiny standard is applied to the grandparents'
right to define their place in the family, the parents' competing right
must be considered. Grandparents could assert the right to be included in the family through visitation with the grandchild. Conversely, parents could assert the right to define their family by
excluding the grandparents' visitation with the nuclear family. Since
these interests squarely conflict, neither adult can define their family
to suit their purposes, and both parent and grandparent are prevented
from asserting their family definitional rights effectively. 70
The strict scrutiny analysis was applied to both the parents' and
grandparents' rights in a recent challenge to Kentucky's grandparent
visitation statute. 71 The attack averred that "the statute in question
constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into the liberty interest of
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
68. See Samuel V. Schoonmaker, III, et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by ThirdParty Access to Children, 25 FAM. L.Q. 95, 105 n.43 (1991); see also Herron
v. Seizak, 468 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (dictum).
69. See, e.g., Brown v. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d 358, 360 (S.C. 1990) (grandparents
must show exceptional circumstances to be granted visitation).
70. Shandling argues, based on Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976), that when a situation arises involving conflicting constitutional interests,
a balancing approach is used to reconcile the conflict. Shandling, supra note
6, at 130, 132. When interests are equally weighted, they are counterbalanced
and ineffective when asserted. Id.
In Planned Parenthood, a wife succeeded in having the Court invalidate a
state statute requiring married women to obtain their husband's consent before
terminating a pregnancy. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 68. The Court
considered the wife's and the husband's interests and reasoned that "[i]nasmuch
as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly
and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance
weighs in her favor. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion emphasized that in balancing the constitutionally protected interests,
the woman's constitutional right prevailed. Id. at 90. Unlike the parties in
Planned Parenthood, the parent and grandparent share equally weighted interests, and, hence, the interests counterbalance and are ineffective.
71. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1984) provides that "[t]he circuit
court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal
grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree
if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so." Id.
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parents to rear their children as they see fit."72 In King v. King,73 a
grandfather petitioQed the court for visitation rights with his granddaughter, with whom he had established a relationship when she and
her parents resided on his farm for'sixteen months. During that time,
the grandfather had almost daily contact with his granddaughter.
After a quarrel, however, the family was asked to leave. When the
grandfather's request to visit his grandchild was rejected, he filed
suit to compel visitation under Kentucky's grandparent visitation
statute, which provides "[t]he circuit court may grant reasonable
visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal grandparents of a
child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree if it
determines that is in the best interests of the child. "74
Following award by the trial court of visitation to the grandfather, the parents appealed, challenging both the constitutionality of
the statute and the trial court's finding that visitation would be in
the child's best interest. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected
the parents' argument that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, holding that the state's
interest in protecting the grandparent-grandchild relationship overrides the parent's right of privacy in the upbringing of their child. 7s
The court noted that the grandparent visitation statute was adopted
to strengthen familial bonds in an age when divorce is prevalent and
people live far away from their extended family. 76 The court stated
the following:
If a grandparent is physically, mentally and morally fit,
then a grandchild will ordinarily benefit from contact with
the grandparent. That grandparent and grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits
from contact with the other. The child can learn respect, a
sense of responsibility and love. The grandparent can be
invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an insight into
our changing society, and can avoid the loneliness which is
so often a pare of an aging parent's life. These considerations by the state do not go too far in intruding into the
fundamental rights of parents. 77
The court found that parents, grandparents, and children are
sufficiently protected by the statute. The parents' rights are protected
because the grandparents must file an action in court, a hearing must
be conducted, and findings of fact and conclusions of law must be
72. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 378 (1992).
73. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 378 (1992).
74. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1984).
75. King, 828 S.W.2d at 631-32.
76. Id. at 632.
77.Id.
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entered that the best interests of the child will be served by the
court's order. 78 Based on the importance of the relationship between
the grandparent and grandchild and the judicial protection offered
the parents, the court held the statute constitutional. 79 The court also
affirmed the trial court's decision that visitation would be in the
child's best interest. 8o

B.

Equal Protection

The Skeens court, which held that Maryland's grandparent visitation statute was not limited to the marriage context,8! recognized
that "possible equal protection implications" would result from
legislation intended to restrict visitation rights to the marriage situation.82 The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause would,
perhaps, be violated by the denial of visitation to grandparents of
children whose parents live together while granting visitation to
grandparents of children whose parents do not reside together. 83
The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
demands that similarly situated individuals be treated alike.84 Classification by the legislature must not be arbitrary, and there must be
a valid reason for disparate treatment. 85 To be upheld, a statutory
classification that interferes in a significant manner with a fundamental right must meet strict scrutiny standards by satisfying a
compelling state interest and being narrowly tailored to further that
interest. 86 Grandparents denied visitation rights in an intact marriage
situation could argue that an award of visitation to grandparents in
a dissolved marriage situation violates equal protection. Because the
fundamental right of "family definition" is implicated, the state
would have to show a compelling interest to justify the disparate
treatment of grandparents.
A grandparent asserting an equal protection argument must
attempt to persuade the court that the state's interest is insufficiently
compelling to override the grandparent's fundamental right of family
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 632-33.
Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 60-61, 480 A.2d 820, 826, cert. denied,
301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984); see also supra notes 10-16 and accompanying
text.
Skeens, 60 Md. App. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: " ...
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14.1 at 523 (3rd ed. 1983).
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
NOWACK, supra note 85, § 14.3 at 530.
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definition. Hence, the state's interference with that right would be
declared a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the grandparent would be awarded visitation. Only one court has explored the
equal protection implications of grandparent visitation. In Ward v.
Ward, the Family Court of the State of Delaware stated that
[t]here appears to be valid reasons to support the legislative
grant of power to parents living together as opposed to
parents who are living apart or where one parent or both
are deceased. Stated simply, parents . . . living together as
husband and wife are more likely to make decisions regarding with whom their children associate in a manner that
protects their children's best interests. Personal animosity
towards the other parent and his [or her] family is less likely
to color this visitation decision. Furthermore, parents living
together are equally informed regarding the children's needs
and desires. 87
The court relied on this rationale to dismiss the grandpalents' cause
of action based on an equal protection argument where no fundamental right was involved. 88 The court held that the state interest
was "reasonably conceived" and justified the legislative differentiation of grandparents. 89
IV.

SURVEY OF STATE COURT DECISIONS

The state courts rendering decisions in cases involving grandparent visitation in intact marriages have reached their holdings by
balancing the statutory and constitutional interests at stake. The
states of New York, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
New Jersey have decided cases based on the standing issue, while
Connecticut, Delaware, and Kentucky have addressed the constitutional issues. These decisions are instructional as to the possibilities
available to Maryland courts.
The courts of New York have resolved the issue of standing to
petition for visitation in an intact marriage in favor of the grandparents. In Emanuel S. v. Joseph E.,9O the Court of Appeals of New
York resolved a conflict among the lower courts, holding that section
72 of New York's Domestic Relations Law, which provides for
grandparent visitation, may be applied to grant standing to grand87. [d. at 1070.
88. Due to Delaware custom that family law briefs are available only to parties to
the litigation, the authors were unable to determine whether the grandparents
asserted the violation of a "fundamental right."
89. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1070.
90. 577 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).

j
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parents seeking visitation with a grandchild when the nuclear family
is intact and the parents object to visitation. 91
In the case, Emanuel S., the grandfather of one-year-old Max,
petitioned the family court for visitation with his grandchild. Emanuel
and his wife visited with Max during the first three months of his
life but were spurned when their relationship with Max's parents
deteriorated. A peti~ion was filed under section 72 of New York's
Domestic Relations Law, which provides that visitation may be
awarded "where circumstances show that conditions exist which
equity would see fit to intervene."92 The court noted that the statute
requires the family court to deal with the question of standing to
petition for visitation and the question of the child's best interests.
Rejecting previous judicial construction, the court interpreted the
equitable circumstances clause to include not only the disrupted
nuclear family, but the intact nuclear family as well. 93 The court of
appeals directed family courts to exercise discretion in conferring
standing, making it conditional on the grandparents demonstrating
a sufficient existing relationship with their grandchild. In cases where
that relationship has been frustrated by the parents, grandparents
must show a sufficient effort to establish a grandparent-grandchild
relationship, measured by what the grandparents had done against
what they reasonably could have done. 94 Focusing only on whether
the grandparents had standing to seek visitation, the court did not
address any constitutional implications. 95
Similar to New York's statute, in that it is not limited to
visitation arising from a circumstance of dissolution or death, Wis9l. In the previous decade, the New York lower courts split over the five litigated
cases involving an intact marriage. ln two cases, visitation rights in an intact
marriage were held to be compatible with the statute. Frances E. v. Peter E.,
479 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Fam. Ct. 1984); Matter of La Russo, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10,
1983, p. 14, col. 6 (Westchester Fam. Ct.). In the other three cases, visitation
rights in an intact marriage were held incompatible with the statute. Frances
S. v. Rachel K., 563 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1990); Emanuel S. v. Joseph
E., 560 N.Y.S.2d 211 (App. Div. 1990); Theodore R. v. Loretta J., 476
N.Y.S.2d 720 (Fam. Ct. 1984).
92. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1992) provides:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within
this state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that
conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent
or the grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by
commencing a special proceeding ... [and] the court, by order, after
due notice to the parent or any other person or party having care,
custody, and control of such child ... may make such direction as
the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for
such grandparent or grandparents in respect to. such child.
93. Emanuel S., 573 N. Y.S.2d at 38.
94. [d. at 39.
95. [d.
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consin's grandparent visitation statute96 has been narrowly construed
to reject visitation rights in an intact setting. The 1981 version of
Wisconsin's grandparent visitation provided as follows:
The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a
grandparent or greatgrandparent of any minor child upon
the grandparent's or greatgrandparent's petition to the court
with notice to the parties if the court determines that it is
in the best interest and welfare of the child and issue any
necessary order to enforce the same. 97
In Van Cleve v. Hemminger,98 the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
limited the statute's application to cases where an underlying action
affecting the family unit had been previously filed. 99 The case involved
a petition by a grandmother for visitation in a situation where there
was an intact marriage with no prior action affecting the parents and
their two children. The grandmother's petition for visitation was
dismissed by the trial court. Rejecting a literal reading of the statute
which supported the grandmother's position and relying on legislative
history that suggested an intent to restrict standing to situations in
which an action had been instituted, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court. 1OO The court cited public policy reasons to support its
view that the legislature had intended to craft a narrow statute. The
court further suggested that it is appropriate for a court to protect
the child's best interests by ordering visitation with grandparents "to
mitigate the trauma and impact of a dissolving family relationship,"lOl
but in the absence of this trauma and crisis, the state has no justifiable
reason to override a parental determination as to what is in the best
interests of their child. 102
Similarly, the State of North Carolina's grandparent visitation
statute lO3 has been restricted to situations where the custody of minor
96. The current version of WIS. STAT. § 767.245 (1991) provides:
(1) Upon petition by a grandparent, great-grandparent, step parent or
person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child
relationship with the child, the court may grant reasonable visitation
rights to the person if the parents have notice of the hearing and if '
the court determines that visitation is in the best interest of the
child ....
(2) Whenever possible, in making a determination under sub. (1), the
court shall consider the wishes of the child.
97. WIS. STAT. § 767.245(4) (1981).
98. 415 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
99. [d. at 573.
100. [d. at 573-74.
101. [d. at 574.
102. [d.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bl) (1987) provides that "[aln order for custody
of a minor child may provide visitation rights for any grandparent of the <;hild
as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate."
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children is being litigated. In Moore v. Moore,l04 the relationship
between paternal grandparents and their married son and daughterin-law was terminated by the son after a dispute involving business
matters. Although the grandparents had visited frequently with their
grandchildren prior to the dispute, afterwards the parents foreclosed
all visitation. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the grandparents' petition on the ground
that the grandparents lacked standing to bring suit. lOS The court
noted that whereas North Carolina's statute "authorizes the court to
provide visitation rights of grandparents when the custody of minor
children is being litigated, it does not authorize the court to enter
such an order when the custody of the children is not even in
issue."106 The court added that it "is fundamental that parents who
have lawful custody of their minor children have the prerogative of
determining with whom their children shall associate. "107 Assuming
even that children would benefit by visits with their grandparents,
the court recognized the restriction promulgated by the legislature
and concluded that "our courts have no blanket commission from
the law to control children for their benefit. " lOS
Pennsylvania courts have similarly maintained a strict reading
of their grandparent visitation statute. In Herron v. Seizak,t09 the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that absent parental abuse or
neglect, a grandparent has no right to obtain a visitation order in
an intact marriage. 110 After being denied visitation with their grandchild, the Herrons petitioned the court for visitation, but their petition
was dismissed. On appeal to the superior court, the Herrons argued
that the best interests of the child would be served by allowing
visitation, "because the child will be hurt psychologically if she is
permitted to grow up knowing that her parents forbid her to visit
with her maternal grandparents and knowing that she is not permitted
to speak to them when they telephone." 111 The court rejected the
Herrons' petition based on a lack of standing, holding that the courts
may intrude into family life only in the three circumstances listed in
the statute: J12 (1) when a parent is deceased, (2) when the parents'
marriage is dissolved, or (3) when the child has resided with grandparents for a period of twelve months or more.1I3 Because both
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Moore v. Moore, 365 S.E.2d 662, 663 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
[d. at 663.
[d.
[d.
[d.
468 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
ld. at 805.
[d. at 804.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1001 - 1015 (1981) (repealed 1985).
Herron. 468 A.2d at 805.
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parents of the grandchild were alive and married to one another, the
Herrons' petition failed to engage the protections afforded by the
.
statute. 114
The State of New Jersey's visitation statute provides for grandparent visitation where either or both of the parents of a minor child
is deceased or where the parents are divorced or living apart if the
court determines that such visitation would be in the best interests
of the child. lIS In Thompson v. Vanaman,1I6 the trial court, construing
the statute in a broad manner, allowed grandparent visitation in an
intact marriage setting.1I7 The court reasoned that the legislative intent
was not to limit grandparent visitation only to those situations
mentioned in the statute, but rather that the court should be concerned with the overall welfare of the child. liS
The facts in' Thompson provided a strong argument for awarding
grandparent visitation. The grandmother petitioning for visitation
cared for her grandchildren daily over a four-year period while the
children's parents worked. Despite the fact that the grandmother
provided care that otherwise would have been supplied by the children's mother, the children's parents halted all contact between the
grandmother and the grandchildren after a dispute. The trial court
stated that "[t]he mere fact that a parent does not desire visitation
between his children and their grandparents can never by itself be
sufficient reason for denying that visitation. "119
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and
denied the grandmother visitation, holding that the statute limited
visitation to the situations recited. 120 Citing the general common law
rule that grandparent visitation is based upon parental approval, the
court explained that it is in the child's best interest to respect the
114. Id.
115. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1992) provides:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within
the State, is or are deceased, or divorced or living separate and apart
in different habitats, regardless of the existence of a court order or
agreement, a grandparent or the grandparents of such child, who is
or are the parents of such deceased, separated or divorced parent or
parents, or any sibling of the child may apply to the Superior Court,
in accordance with the Rules of Court, to have such child brought
before such court; and the court may make such order or judgment,
as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for
such grandparent, grandparents or sibling in respect to such child.
116. 509 A.2d 304 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (Thompson I), rev'd, 515 A.2d 1254
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (Thompson II); see also supra notes 17-21
and accompanying text.
117. Thompson I, 509 A.2d at 306.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Thompson II, 515 A.2d at 1255.
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wishes of the parent and not thrust the child into the midst of a
conflict between the parents and the grandparents. 121 Construing the
statute narrowly, the court reasoned that only when the nuclear
family is disrupted does the grandparent have an independent cause
of action for securing visitation rights. In other circumstances, the
court lacks the authority to force the child into a situation filled
with anger. 122
Connecticut's visitation statute was construed in Lehrer v. Davis,l23
in which the court concluded that it could not adjudicate the constitutional claim made by the grandparents due to the lack of a
sufficient statement of facts.124 Despite this conclusion, the court
proceeded to analyze the constitutional implications of Connecticut's
statute, an analysis the concurrence derisively termed "obiter dicta." 125
The parties in Lehrer stipulated that Rosalind and Irving Lehrer
were the grandparents of Philip and Penny Davis's two minor children, both of whom lived with their parents in an intact family
setting. As the natural grandmother, Rosalind brought the original
petition, but was later joined by Irving, the stepgrandfather, who
intervened in the proceeding. The petition noted that the grandchildren had never lived with their grandparents and had virtually no
face-to-face or telephonic contact with them for over a year. The
Lehrers petitioned the court to permit them to visit their grandchildren on the authority of Connecticut General Statutes section 46b59, which provides for visitation to any person when the court deems
it in the best interest of the child. 126 The Davises moved to strike the
Lehrers' cause of action on two grounds: first, that the common law
afforded them no authority for such relief, and second, that the
visitation statute was unconstitutional. 127 Upon request of both parties, the trial court granted a motion for reservation upon stipulated

121. [d.
122. [d.

123. 571 A.2d 691 (Conn. 1990).
124. Id. at 695.
125. Id. (Shea, J., concurring).
126. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1986) provides:

COURT MAY GRANT RIGHT OF VISITATION TO ANY PERSON. The superior court may grant the right of visitation with respect
to any minor child or children to any person, upon an application of
such person. Such order shall be according to the court's best judgment
upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. . . . [T]he court shall be guided by the
best interest of the child, giving consideration to the wishes of such
child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an intelligent
opinion.
127. Lehrer, 571 A.2d at 692.
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facts for the Supreme Court of Connecticut to resolve the question
of the constitutionality of the statute in question. 128
The Supreme Court of Connecticut first noted that the stipulation lacked essential information concerning the extent of the earlier
relationship between the Lehrers and their grandchildren, the reasons
for the Davises' severing of contacts, the presence or absence of
reason to believe that one or both of the Lehrers may have been
abusing the children or acting in some manner inconsistent with their
best interests, the presence or absence of reason to believe that one
or both of the Davises may have been abusing the children or acting
in some manner inconsistent with their best interests, or the opinions
of the children themselves concerning the proposed visitation. 129 After
determining that the stipulation was, in essence, a request for advice
about the facial validity of the statute in a factual vacuum, the court
entered a lengthy discussion addressing the constitutional challenge
to the statute.
Under a due process analysis, the court recognized that the
Davises, as parents, enjoyed a constitutional right to care for and
manage the upbringing of their children. This protection included
the right of the family to remain together without the coercive
interference of the state. 130 The court noted, however, that the family
is not beyond regulation in the public interest, and the rights of
parenthood are not beyond limitation. 131 Legitimate state regulation
of an intact family can be based upon the best interests of the child,
despite the heightened claim of parents in an intact marriage to due
process protection. 132 Such regulation would be valid, for instance,
in the case of child abuse. 133 The court indicated that parents in an
intact marriage enjoy greater due process protection than parents in
a dissolved relationship, but later tempered this, stating that
[t]he defendants' status as an intact family, while arguably
heightening their claim to procedural due process ... cannot
fill this factual vacuum. The fact that a family is intact
does not guarantee the absence of child abuse. Even absent
child abuse, there is no compelling constitutional requirement that the legislature must defer, in every instance, to
the child-rearing preferences of the nuclear family. "To
assert that, as a matter of law, a widowed, divorced, remarried, or unmarried parent is subject to greater [s]tate
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

[d.
[d. at 692.
[d. at 693-94.
[d.
/d.
[d.
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interference than a married parent would be to assert that
the former is less fit than the latter to raise his or her own
child." 134
In addition, the court stated that the legislature may recognize a
public interest in affording a child access to those outside the nuclear
family who manifest a deep concern for the growth and development
of the child, and that depriving children of maintaining such meaningful relationships may violate the child's constitutional rights. 13S
The court noted that grandparents are not automatically precluded
from obtaining visitation rights; it determined, however, that the
facts necessary to decide the issue had not been brought out at the
trial level, thus it remanded the case for further adjudication. 136
Delaware's grandparent visitation statute survived a two-prong
constitutional attack in Ward v. Ward.137 The statute provided that
"when the natural or adoptive parents of the child are cohabiting as
husband and wife,. grandparent visitation shall not be granted over
both parents' objection."13s In Ward, Russell and Edna Ward petitioned the Family Court of Delaware for visitation rights with their
grandchildren under Delaware's then-~xisting grandparent visitation
statute,139 which authorized the court to order visitation "regardless
of marital status of the parents of the child or the relationship of
the grandparents to the person having custody of the child."I40 The
court found visitation would be in the best interests of the children
and granted visitation one weekend per month.
The parents appealed the decision and requested the order be
stayed pending appeal. The stay was denied, but while the matter
was on appeal, the statute was amended to include the present
language,141 rendering the lower court decision moot. 142 The case was
remanded to the family court, and the parents, Daniel and Barbara
Ward, petitioned the court to modify visitation. 143 The grandparents
moved to dismiss the modification petition, asserting that the statute
134. [d. at 694-95 (quoting In the Matter of Frances E. v. Peter E., 479 N.Y.S.2d
319 (Fam. Ct. 1989».
135. [d. at 695.
136. [d.
137. 537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987).
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (1990).
139. [d. § 950(7) (1976).
140. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1064.
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1065.
143. Daniel and Barbara Ward originally filed an emergency motion for summary
judgment and for stay of visitation. At that time, however, there was no
formal summary judgment practice under the Rules of the Family Court.
Additionally, it was not clear to the court what effect the amendment had on
previously issued orders. [d. at 1065 n.2.
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was unconstitutional on both due process and equal protection
grounds. 144
Under a due process analysis, the court rejected the grandparent's
argument that the statute violated their constitutional right to have
a relationship with their grandchildren. 14s Based on a lengthy analysis,
the court stated that "[g]randparents, as a general rule, are not
charged with the responsibilities of raising their, grandchildren when
the grandchildren reside with their parents, and, absent such a
custodial relationship, no liberty interest is conferred upon them."I46
The court entertained the idea that grandparents may enjoy an
enhanced constitutional interest by virtue of their biological tie coupled with a special and positive relationship, but it nonetheless held
that when children reside with parents in an intact marriage, this
interest can never supersede the fundamental interest of parents in
raising their children in an intact family unit. 147
The court also dismissed the grandparents' argument that their
equal protection rights were violated under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United'States Constitution. The grandparents argued
that, as grandparents of grandchildren living in an intact marriage
situation, they were unlawfully treated in a disparate fashion from
grandparents of grandchildren living in a dissolved situation. l48 The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that since no fundamental
right of the grandparents was involved, the state had to show only
a reasonable justification for the discriminatory statute. 149 Since parents living together as' husband and wife are more likely to make
decisions regarding their children without coloring such decisions
with personal animosity towards the other parent, the decisions of
these parents will more likely be in the best interest of the children.
Parents who are separated or divorced, on the other hand, may be
more likely to decide visitation based on animosity toward the other
parent and their child's best interests may be affected. In the latter
situation, the court found the state has a reasonable justification to
144. Ward, 537 A.2d at 1064-65. Russell and Edna Ward made a third argument
under the Delaware constitution based on Separation of Powers, arguing that
the Delaware General Assembly effectively denied them access to the court.
The court stated that the Separation of Powers Doctrine under the Delaware
constitution protects a litigant's right to raise fundamental rights in an appropriate judicial proceeding and that the legislature may not restrict this right.
Since the court refused to recognize a fundamental right enjoyed by the
grandparents, the court held that the legislature did not violate the grandparents'
right to litigate the matter in an appropriate judicial setting. [d. at 107l.
145. [d. at 1066-69.
146. [d. at 1068-69.
147. [d. at 1069.
148. [d.
149. [d. at 1070.
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interfere with parental decision-making; in the former situation, no
such justification exists. ISO
Legislation in Illinois concerning grandparent visitation has come
full circle, from recognizing visitation rights only when marriage
dissolution proceedings have been instituted or a parent is deceased,
to awarding visitation in an intact marriage, and then back again to
allowing visitation only in a dissolution or death situation. lSI In 1982,
the Illinois legislature amended the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act ("IMDMA") to allow grandparents the right to
petition for visitation. ls2
In Towne v. Cole,ls3 the Appellate Court of Illinois construed
this statute to give grandparents visitation rights only after proceedings to dissolve the marriage had been initiated by the parents of the
grandchildren. In Towne, Joan Towne brought suit against her son
and daughter-in-law, petitioning the court for visitation rights and
seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress after
being denied contact with her two year old grandchild. The court
analyzed the statute's legislative history, concluding that it provided
for visitation only in the case of marriage dissolution or death of a
parent}S4 Denying Ms. Towne's visitation rights, the court held the
statute inapplicable and recognized the parent's common law right
to exclude third parties from visiting with their children. ISS In addition, the court denied the grandmother's cause of action for emotional distress because she could not show that the parent's conduct
was extreme and outrageous.t S6
150. Id. The argument can be made that even in an intact marriage the best interests

of a child will be compromised when visitation decisions regarding grandparents
are made based on animosity toward the grandparents and not based on the
child's welfare.
151. Edward M. Burns, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is It Time for the Pendulum
to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q. 59, 64-65, 74-75 (1991).
152. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1982) provided:
(b)(I) The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent [or] great-grandparent of any minor child upon the grandparent's or great-grandparent's petition to the court, with notice to the
parties required to be notified under Section 601 of th~s Act, if the
court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the
child and may issue any necessary orders to enforce such visitation
privileges:

153.
154.
155.
156.

(3) Further, the court, pursuant to this subsection, may grant
reasonable visitation privileges to a grandparent or great-grandparent
whose child has died where the court determines that it is in the best
interests and welfare of the child.
478 N.E.2d 895 (III. App. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 898-900.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 900-01.
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In 1989, the Illinois legislature extended grandparent visitation
rights to an intact marriage. ls7 This extension was short lived, however, for effective July 1, 1991, the statute was revised to again
restrict grandparents' visitation to dissolution or death. ISS
V.

STATE GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES
Many states permit grandparents to petition the court for visitation rights without basing standing on a prior breakup of the
nuclear family. The states of Kentucky, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah apply a reasonableness and best
interest standard. Idaho measures the reasonableness of awarding
visitation. Alabama and South Carolina give the court sole discretion
to award visitation. These states' grandparent visitation statutes are
.
set forth in the Appendix.
As asserted above, the grandparent's constitutional right to
visitation rests on the fundamental
right of family definition,
which
I
_
has yet to win widespread judicial recognition. ls9 To ensure that
grandparents have the ability to visit their grandchildren, the authors
recommend that the Maryland legislature revise the present statute.
A PROPOSED STATUTE FOR MARYLANDI60
Section 9-102 of Maryland's family law article should be revised
to take into account the interests of not only the child and the
parents, but the grandparents as well. These interests include the
child's welfare and best interests, the parents' interest in the relationship with their child, and the grandparent's interest in the relationship with their grandchild. The following proposed language
would take such interests into account:
The grandparents of a natural or adopted minor child may
be granted reasonable visitation rights with the child if the
VI.

157. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1989).
158. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(b) (1991) provides that grandparents may
not petition for visitation in an intact marriage, unless one or more of the
following exist:
(A) the parents are not currently cohabiting on a permanent or an
indefinite basis;
(B) one of the parents has been absent from the marital abode for
more than one month without the spouse knowing his or her whereabouts;
(C) one of the parents is deceased;
(D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the grandparents,
great-grandparents, or sibling; or
(E) a sibling is in State custody.
Id.
159. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
160. As this article went to print, the governor of Maryland signed into law Senate
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court finds it to be in the best interest of the child, and it
would not unduly interfere with the parent-child relationship
as determined by the court.
This proposed formulation would protect the best interests of the
child while balancing the interests of the parents and grandparents.
The parents' interests are protected by the provision for "reasonable"
visitation. This qualifier allows the court to guard against visitation
that would be burdensome for the parents. In addition, the parents'
relationship with the child is protected by the requirement that the
visitation not interfere excessively with the parent-child relationship.
The grandparents' interest in obtaining visitation rights is met because
the language provides for standing even in the intact marital situation.
A requirement that the court consider the past relationship between
the grandparent and grandchild has been omitted. This omission is
based on the understanding that just because a relationship has been
effectively stifled in the past, it need not be precluded in the future.
By adopting this language, the Maryland legislature could assure that
the interests of all of the parties involved will be considered by the
court. Until such time as the legislature addresses this issue, parents
and grandparents will have to rely on the Maryland courts to resolve
their disputes regarding visitation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

When Mary land courts wrestle with the issue of grandparents'
visitation rights in an intact marriage, the decision may ultimately
turn on how the appellate courts view the importance of the relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild. Based on a
broad reading of the grandparent visitation statute (which would
grant standing to grandparents), Maryland's appellate courts may be
forced to determine whether the parents' constitutional rights are
outweighed by the state's interest in allowing grandparent visitation.
Apart from circumstances which are compelling due to child abuse
or neglect, if the appellate courts view grandparent visitation as a
compelling need, the parents' constitutional right of privacy can be
overcome. If, however, the appellate courts do not view grandparent
Bill 612, Chapter 252 of the Laws of Maryland 1993, revising section 9-102.
The revised section reads:
An equity court may:
(I) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a
grandparent; and
(2) grant visitation rights to the grandparent.
1993 Md. Laws 252.
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visitation as compelling, the parents' privacy right will prevail and
visitation will be denied.
Ultimately, the Maryland appellate system may be forced to take
a legal stand regarding an oft-quoted New Jersey court's insight into
the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren: 161
It is biological fact that grandparents are bound to their
grandchildren by the unbreakable links of heredity. It is
common human experience that the concern and interest
grandparents take in the welfare of their grandchildren far
exceeds anything explicable in purely biological terms. A
very special relationship often arises and continues between
grandparents and grandchildren. The tensions and conflicts
which commonly mar relations between parents and children
are often absent between those very same grandparents and
their grandchildren. Visits with a grandparent are often a
precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits
which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship
with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any
other relationship. 162

APPENDIX

Alabama - Ala. Code § 30-3-4 (1989).
At the discretion of the court, visitation rights for grandparents
of minor grandchildren shall be granted in the following cases:
(a) The parents of the child have filed for a dissolution of their
marriage ... ;
(b) One parent of the child is deceased and the surviving parent
denies reasonable visitation rights; or
(c) A grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child
for a period exceeding 90 days.

Connecticut - Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-59 (1986).
The superior court may grant the right of visitation with respect
to any minor child or children to any person, upon an application
of such person.

161. See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993), in which the
Court of Appeals of Maryland cited with approval this section from Mimkon
v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1975).
162. Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (N.J. 1975).
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Idaho - Idaho Code § 32-1008 (1983).
When a grandparent or grandparents have established a substantial relationship with a minor child, the district court may, upon
a proper showing, grant reasonable visitation rights to said grandparent or grandparents.
Kentucky - Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 405.021 (Baldwin 1984).
(1) The circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to
either the parental or maternal grandparents of a child and issue any
necessary orders to enforce the decree if it determines that it is in
the best interest of the child to do so.
Mississippi - Miss. Code Ann. § 93-16-3(2) (1992).
Any grandparent who is not authorized to petition for visitation
rights pursuant to subsection (1) of this section may petition the
chancery court and seek visitation rights with his or her grandchild,
and the court may grant visitation rights to the grandparent, provided
the court finds:
(a) That the grandparent of the child had established a viable
relationship with the child and the parent or custodian of the child
unreasonably denied the grandparent visitation rights with the child;
and
(b) That visitation rights of the grandparent with the child would
be in the best interests of the child.
New York - N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 72 (Supp. 1993).
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing
within this state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show
that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene, a
grandparent or the grandparents of such child may apply to the
supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of
habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court, or may
apply to the family court pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six
hundred fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return thereof,
the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any person or
party having the care, custody, and control of such child, to be
given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such
directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation
rights for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child. 163
163. In Smith v. Jones, the Family Court for Nassau County stated in dicta its
belief that New York's grandparent visitation statute was "repugnant to the
Privacy Rights of Citizens as assured under the U.S. Constitution's 14th
Amendment (and 9th Amendment)." Smith v. Jones, 587 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511
(1992) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973».
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North Dakota - N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-05.1 (1989).
The grandparents and great grandparents of an unmarried minor
may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the minor during the
period of minority by the district court upon a finding that visitation
would be in the best interests of the minor and would not interfere
with the parent-child relationship. The court shall consider the amount
of personal contact between the grandparents or great grandparents
and the minor, and the minor's parents, prior to the application.

Oklahoma - Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. to, § 5 (West Supp. 1993).
A. 1. Pursuant to the provisions of this section, any grandparent
of an unmarried minor child shall have reasonable rights of visitation
to the child if the district court deems it to be in the best interest of
the child. The right of visitation to any grandparent of an unmarried
minor child shall be granted only so far as that right is authorized
and provided by order of the district court.

South Carolina - S.c. Code Ann. § 20-7-420 (Law Co-op. 1985).
The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction:
(33) To order periods of visitation for the grandparents of the
child.

Tennessee - Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-301 (1991).
(a) The natural or legal grandparents of an unmarried minor
child may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the child during
such child's minority by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
finding that such visitation rights would be in the best interests of
the minor child.

Utah - Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1989).
The district court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of
visitation to grandchildren, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren.

